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Abstract
Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psycho-
logical games and the recent progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by
Heifetz et al. (2013a), we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness
in the strategic interaction of players motivated by belief-dependent preferences
like reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with
belief-dependent preferences and simple unawareness, define extensive-form ratio-
nalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the
strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness
influences players’ beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations
of others which in turn impacts their behavior.
Keywords: Unawareness; Belief-dependent preferences; Extensive-form rationalizabil-
ity.
JEL-Classifications: C72, C73, D80
1 Introduction
Recent lab and field evidence suggests that people not only care about the monetary
consequences of their actions, but that their behavior is also driven by belief-dependent
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psychological preferences [e.g., Fehr et al. (1993), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Falk
et al. (2008), Bellemare et al. (2010)]. Two prominent examples of belief-dependent pref-
erences in the hitherto existing literature are reciprocity [e.g., Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)] and guilt aversion [for example,
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)]. Departing from
the strictly consequentialist tradition in economics, Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Bat-
tigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) present general frameworks for analyzing the strategic
interaction of players with belief-dependent preferences: ‘psychological games’. Roughly
speaking, psychological games are games in which players’ preferences depend upon play-
ers’ beliefs about the strategies that are being played, players’ beliefs about the beliefs
of others about the strategies that are being played, and so on.
A widely unspoken assumption that is underlying game-theoretic analyses, and there-
fore also the analyses of psychological games, is that players are aware of all facts char-
acterizing the strategic environment they are in. However, in many real life situations
this is not the case. People often have asymmetric awareness levels concerning their
own as well as the feasible choices of others although they are part of the same strategic
environment. People are frequently surprised in the sense that they become aware of
new strategic alternatives by observing actions they had previously been unaware of. In
recent years different models of unawareness have been proposed showing the importance
of unawareness for individual decision making problems as well as the strategic interac-
tion of players in standard (non-psychological) games [e.g., Fagin and Halpern (1988),
Dekel et al. (1998), Modica and Rustichini (1999), Halpern (2001), Heifetz et al. (2006),
Halpern and Reˆgo (2006), Halpern and Reˆgo (2008), Heifetz et al. (2008), Halpern and
Reˆgo (2009), Li (2009), Feinberg (2011), Grant and Quiggin (2012), Heifetz et al. (2013a)
and Heifetz et al. (2013b)].
However, it is not only in standard games that unawareness is important. We show in
our analysis here that unawareness has a profound and distinct impact on the strategic
interaction of players in psychological games. To see this consider the following intuitive
example: Imagine two friends, Ann and Bob. Assume it is Bob’s birthday, he is planning
a party and would be very happy, if Ann could come. Unfortunately Bob’s birthday
coincides with the date of Ann’s final exam at university. She can either decide to take
the exam the morning after Bob’s party or two weeks later at a second date. Ann is
certain that Bob would feel let down, if she were to cancel his party without having
a very good excuse. Quite intuitively, although Ann would really like to get over her
exam as soon as possible, she might anticipate feeling guilty from letting down Bob if
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she canceled his party to take the exam the following morning. As a consequence, Ann
might choose the second date to avoid letting Bob down. In contrast, consider now the
following variant of the same example: Ann knows that Bob is unaware of the second
date. In this situation Ann might choose to take the exam on the first date and not feel
guilty. Since Bob is unaware of the second date and the final exam is a good excuse,
he does not expect Ann to come. Ann knows this and, hence, does not feel guilty as
Bob is not let down. In fact, if she were certain that Bob would never become aware of
the second date, she probably had a strong emotional incentive to leave him unaware in
order not to raise his expectations. That is, she had a strong incentive not to make him
aware of the fact that she actually has the time to come to his party, but just wants to
get over her exam. Interestingly, if Ann were only interested in her own payoff in this
strategic situation with unawareness, she would not care whether Bob is or will become
aware of the second date. She would simply not attend his party irrespective of Bob’s
awareness. Only her belief-dependent feeling of guilt towards Bob creates the strong
emotional incentive to leave him unaware.
Bob’s unawareness concerning Ann’s ability to come to his party and, connectedly,
Ann’s incentive not to tell him about the second date intuitively highlight the focus of our
analysis. We analyze the influence and importance of unawareness concerning feasible
paths of play for the strategic interaction of players in psychological games. To simplify
the analysis we concentrate on two-player strategic environments with simple unaware-
ness. More specifically, building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of
dynamic psychological games and the recent progress in the modeling of unawareness
[Heifetz et al. (2006, 2008, 2013a,b)], we define a two-player model in which players
are motivated by belief-dependent preferences and one player is potentially unaware
of certain feasible paths of play. Using this framework we provide different examples
highlighting the role of unawareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by
reciprocity a` la Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and guilt aversion a` la Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2007). We limit ourselves to two-player environments and simple asymmet-
ric awareness scenarios in order to intuitively introduce our model and clearly uncover
the role of unawareness without burdening the analysis with technical issues arising in
strategic environments allowing for more players and more complex unawareness.
Our examples demonstrate that the strategic behavior of players motivated by belief-
dependent preferences crucially depends on their awareness concerning the strategic envi-
ronment they are in, their perception concerning the awareness of others, their perception
concerning the perception of others, and so on–a fact that implies both an opportunity as
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well as a challenge to analyses empirically investigating the strength and nature of belief-
dependent preferences. On the one hand, in line with experimental evidence suggesting
that people are more prone to selfish choices if they believe that others will remain
unaware of them [e.g., Dana et al. (2006), Dana et al. (2007), Broberg et al. (2007),
Tadelis (2008), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), Lazear et al. (2009)], our examples show
that varying the degree of awareness in the interaction of players that are motivated
by belief-dependent preferences leads to intuitive and testable predictions distinct from
predictions based on consequentialist preferences like selfishness and inequality aversion
[Fehr and Schmidt (1999)]. On the other hand, it poses a challenge for experimental
investigations in relatively uncontrolled environments like the field or the Internet. As
also seen in our introductory example, not controlling for Ann’s perception concerning
Bob’s awareness might lead to wrong inferences concerning Ann’s inclination to feel
guilty towards Bob. Furthermore, our examples reveal that over and above the actual
choices that are made, managing other people’s awareness levels has to be understood
as an integral and important part of any strategic interaction. By managing other’s
awareness levels, we influence the others’ expectations and perceptions concerning our
intentions, which in turn influences their behavior.
We start out by formulating a model concentrating on two-player extensive-forms
with complete information, observable actions and no chance moves. To allow for un-
awareness we use a standard extensive-form representing the objective strategic environ-
ment and a subtree thereof, and define extensive-forms with simple unawareness with
the help of a possibility function. This possibility function describes for each possible
decision node in the objective extensive-form, and copy thereof in the subtree, the aug-
mented history that players perceive to be at. Our two-player extensive-forms are in
essence a special case of Heifetz et al. (2013a)’s generalized extensive-forms, and there-
fore embeddable in their setting.1 Of course, our extensive-form with unawareness is
not typically common knowledge among players, and therefore should be interpreted
from the modeler’s point of view. In fact, any game that does not explicitly distinguish
between the players’ description of the strategic environment and the modeler’s will fail
to capture unawareness [see Dekel et al. (1998)].
Having defined our class of two-player extensive-forms with unawareness, we formally
characterize belief-dependent preferences in our setting. In synthesis, we define a player’s
1As hinted at before, different models of unawareness have recently been presented in the literature.
Although our analysis closely links to the setting of Heifetz et al. (2013a), we strongly believe that our
idea and intuition can also be formalized extending one of the other frameworks for dynamic unawareness
[Halpern and Reˆgo (2006)].
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strategies and conditional beliefs about the other player’s pure strategies (first-order
beliefs), beliefs about the other player’s beliefs (second-order beliefs), and so on. The
infinite hierarchy of conditional beliefs that we define takes player’s awareness, players’s
perception regarding the other’s awareness, and so forth, into account and is used for the
general specification of our belief-dependent preferences and, hence, the characterization
of our class of dynamic psychological games with simple unawareness. As mentioned
above, specific types of belief-dependent preferences that can be embedded in our model
are among others reciprocity and guilt aversion.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and Sebald
(2010) propose sequential equilibrium as a solution concept for their psychological games.
However, assuming equilibrium play is very demanding in strategic environments involv-
ing unawareness. The implicit assumption made when imposing sequential equilibrium
on strategic settings with unawareness is that if a player becomes aware of more during
the game, he will compute new equilibrium beliefs not rationalizing, for example, why
the other player made him aware. Sequential equilibrium only requires a player to reason
about the other player’s future behavior. For this reason, we impose extensive-form ra-
tionalizability [Pearce (1984)], which embodies forward induction, as a solution concept
for our psychological games with simple unawareness. Extensive-form rationalizability
implies, that along each feasible path of play, every active player is always certain that
the other player sequential best responds, certain that the other player is certain that
he sequential best responds, and so on. If a player finds himself at some augmented his-
tory, where the other player’s strategies that could lead to that augmented history are
inconsistent with the players previous certainty in the other player’s best response, then
the player seeks a best rationalization which could have led to that augmented history
[Battigalli (1997), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)]. That is, if the player is “surprised”
by the other player’s unexpected action, and cannot use Bayesian updating, then he
forms new beliefs that justify this observed inconsistency. In its simplest form, forward-
induction reasoning involves the assumption that, upon observing an unexpected (but
undominated) action of the other player, a player maintains the working hypothesis
that the latter is a sequential best response. The best rationalization principle captures
precisely this type of argument.
After having defined our model, the solution concept and two prominent notions of
belief-dependent preferences, reciprocity and guilt aversion, we describe two examples
to highlight the role of unawareness in the interaction of agents motivated by reciprocity
and guilt aversion. First, we consider a version of the sequential prisoners dilemma also
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analyzed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) featuring a reciprocal second mover,
Bob, who is unaware that the first mover, Ann, can defect.2 Different to Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s analysis assuming full awareness, it is shown that as long as
Bob is unaware of the fact that Ann could have defected, he defects independent of his
sensitivity to reciprocity - even when Ann chooses to cooperate. The way he perceives
Ann’s kindness does not only depend on what she does, but also on what Bob thinks she
could have done given his awareness of the strategic situation. Ann anticipates this and
defects as long as she cannot cooperate and simultaneously make Bob aware of the fact
that she could have defected. As a second example, we investigate a trust game with
guilt aversion also analyzed in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). We assume that the
second mover, Bob, is guilt averse and aware of everything. Whereas the first mover,
Ann, is unaware that Bob can actually ‘share part of the pie’. Analogue to the intuition
in our introductory example, in this scenario featuring asymmetric awareness Bob does
not feel guilty when ‘grabbing the entire pie’, as he knows that Ann who does not expect
him to share is not let down. Different to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s analysis
assuming full awareness, ‘grabbing the entire pie’ is Bob’s unique equilibrium behav-
ior independent of how guilt averse he is. Both examples highlight that unawareness
in the interaction of players with belief-dependent preferences leads to very intuitive
behavioral predictions distinct from predictions using non-psychological preferences or
no unawareness. Furthermore, it becomes evident that managing others’ awareness lev-
els is an important and integral part of strategic interactions of players motivated by
belief-dependent preferences.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce our two-player
model. Following this, in section 3 we define psychological games with unawareness.
Section 4 contains the definition of our solution concept: extensive-form rationalizabil-
ity. Sections and 6 contain a formal definition of belief-dependent reciprocity and guilt
aversion in our setting with unawareness and two examples. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Model
This section introduces most of the required game-theoretic notation and summarizes
the features of unawareness that are relevant for our analysis. For simplicity, our anal-
ysis focuses on two-player, extensive-form games with observable actions and no chance
2Note that this awareness scenario is similar to the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with un-
awareness analyzed in Feinberg (2004).
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moves. We allow for unawareness concerning feasible paths of play. An unaware player
is unaware of his own unawareness and thinks that the other player is aware of the
same as he is. An aware player, on the other hand, is certain what the other player is
aware of.3 The model relies on Heifetz et al. (2006, 2008, 2013a,b)’s class of games with
unawareness.
2.1 The objectively feasible extensive-form
Consider two players i and j, their finite sets of actions Ai and Aj, and potentially
feasible action profiles (ai, aj) ∈ Ai × Aj. Let there be a finite set of decision nodes N
including the initial node n0. By convention, the game starts at the initial node n0.
As play unravels, each player is informed of the actions that have just occurred. Each
subsequent node thus describes sequences of consecutive action profiles. That is, for
some stage of the game 1 ≤ l, a subsequent node n = (a1, . . . , al) is represented by the
action profile ak = (aki , akj ) where 1 ≤ k ≤ l.
In the continuation we take the view of player i. Analogous definitions apply for
player j. The set of feasible actions for player i may depend on previous actions taken,
and we therefore denote the set of potentially feasible actions at n by Ai,n. Player i is
active at n if Ai,n contains more than one element. There are simultaneous moves at n,
if both players are active at n. A node is terminal, denoted z = (a1, . . . , al), if the set
Ai,z ×Aj,z is empty. Let Z denote the set of terminal nodes.4
2.2 Subjective Views
An aware player’s subjective view of the feasible paths of play coincides with the ob-
jectively feasible extensive-form N . To model an unaware player’s subjective view con-
cerning the feasible paths of play, we make use of a derived extensive-form referred to
as a subtree.
Definition 1. A subset of the objectively feasible extensive-form N is a subtree T if for
some nonempty subset of terminal nodes E ⊆ Z:
T = {n ∈ N ∶ n ≤ z for some z ∈ E}.
3An adaptation of our model and techniques to general extensive-forms with more complex aware-
ness structures can be achieved at a notational cost.
4For a complete definition see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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Subtree T starts at the initial node and ends at one or more terminal nodes in Z. It thus
represents a set of feasible paths of play. Importantly, subtree T is an unaware player’s
subjective view of the feasible paths of play, an aware player’s view of the unaware
player’s subjective view, the unaware player’s view of the aware player’s view of the
feasible paths of play, and so on. It may also represents an initially unaware player’s
view on his own subjective view of the feasible paths of play at an earlier stage of the
game, after his awareness of the feasible paths of play has evolved. Definition 1 does,
however, not imply that an unaware player necessarily needs to be aware of when the
game starts. An unaware player may think that the game starts with the initial mover
being passive effectively moving the start of the game, as he is aware of it, to the node
at which either the aware player or he himself is active.
Nodes n that are in the subtree T also appear in the objectively feasible extensive-
form N . When we jointly consider these nodes, we will need to explicitly differentiate
these. We label by nT the copy in subtree T of the node n in the objective extensive-form
N whenever the copy of n is a part of subtree T , and assume that if the action profile
taken at n leads to n′, then it also leads copy nT to copy n′T . Formally, nT is said to
be a copy of n if n = (a1, . . . , al) = nT . Let N be the collection of non-terminal nodes
in N and copies of these in subtree T and refer to elements of N as decision nodes and
decision copies, respectively.
2.3 Extensive-forms with simple unawareness
In standard extensive-forms with observable actions, commonly known nodes describe
all possible actions that can be taken throughout a game. However, this need not be
the case when a player is unaware of certain feasible paths of play. At a decision node
n in the objective extensive-form N , a player may only be aware of the possible actions
that can be taken at decision copy nT in subtree T .
To formulate such situations, we define augmented histories with the help of a pos-
sibility function. Augmented histories not only describe the sequence of actions taken
before a player has to move, but also the player’s awareness regarding the feasible set of
actions he can choose from.
Definition 2. For player i there exists a one-to-one possibility function:
hi ∶ N → N ,
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defining for each decision node/copy in N the decision node/copy player i perceives to
be at.
We call the outcome of the possibility function an augmented history. A typical
augmented history is denoted by hi, as in hi ∶= hi(n). Let Hi be the complete set of
all augmented histories and HTi the subset thereof containing all mappings into decision
copies in subtree T .
The mapping describes for each decision node inN , and possible decision copy thereof
in T , the decision node/copy that player i perceives to be at. The mapping hi adheres
to properties that regulate which decision nodes/copies players are aware of.5 Because
actions are observable, a player knows the sequence of action profiles that has led to
the decision node/copy he is at, knows that the other player knows, and so on. Thus,
observable actions place two automatic restrictions on augmented histories. First, the
decision node/copy that a player perceives to be at must be described by the sequence of
action profiles observed. That is, augment history hi at a decision node/copy must map
into a decision node/copy that shares past actions (Property 1). Second, observable
actions imply that the augmented history hi maps into a single decision node/copy
(Property 2). Since a player knows of the sequence of action profiles, and thus the
decision node/copy, he does not need to make any inferences about its legitimacy.
We need two more properties to model simple unawareness. First, as we consider
confined awareness it should hold that at decision copy nT ∈ T a player cannot perceive
to be at an augmented history in the objective extensive-form:
Property 3. (Confined awareness): For a decision copy nT in subtree T , the augmented
history hi(nT ) must map into an element in subtree T .
[Figure 1 and 2]
Second, at decision node n in the objective extensive-form N a player cannot antic-
ipate to become unaware:
Property 4. (No anticipation to become unaware): For a decision node n and path
n, . . . , n′ in the objective extensive-form N , the augmented history hi(n′) must map
into an element in the objective extensive-form N .
5As the simple unawareness structure that we consider here only requires one subtree T in addition
to the objective extensive-form N , we do not have to consider all properties laid out by Heifetz et al.
(2013a).
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[Figure 3 and 4]
Given these properties, an augmented history can only map: (i) from a decision
node/copy into itself, or (ii) from a decision node into its decision copy in the subtree
T .6
Because the awareness of the two players may differ, we need to be explicit about
their subjective view regarding each other’s (perhaps more restricted) subjective view at
each augmented history. For this purpose we make use of the composite of the possibility
function. The composite possibility function of player i is hj ○hi(n), stating that player
i: (i) considers the augmented history he perceives to be in, and (ii) from that point of
view he considers the augmented history he thinks that player j perceives to be in. In
a game without unawareness (i) and (ii) will coincide, but this need not to be the case
in games with unawareness. A typical outcome of the composite possibility function,
which is an augmented history, is denoted by hji, as in hji ∶= hj ○hi(n).7
So what does it mean to be unaware? Whenever player i is at an augmented history
hi ∈ HTi , he is only aware of augmented histories in HTi . However, whenever player i
finds himself at augmented history hi ∈Hi/HTi he is aware of augmented histories in Hi.
In other words, at hi ∈ HTi player i is unaware of augmented histories in Hi/HTi . For
some augmented history hi ∈ Hi/HTi it may also be the case that hji ∈ HTj , describing
the situation where player i knows that player j at hi is unaware of some feasible paths
of play. Finally, for hi ∈HTi we always have that hji ∈HTi . That is, an unaware player i
is unaware of his own unawareness.
We now demonstrate, by a simple example, the structure of extensive-forms with
unawareness. Consider the extensive-form underlying the sequential prisoners dilemma
also analyzed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
[Figure 5]
Figure 5 shows the objective extensive-form N and a subtree T . Consider first the
objective extensive-form N . At the initial decision node n0, Ann can choose between
Cooperate (C) and Defect (D) while Bob is passive. In decision nodes n1 and n2, Bob
can choose between cooperate (c) and defect (d) while Ann is passive. In subtree T , on
6The restrictions and properties imposed in this subsection are consistent with the relevant un-
awareness properties in Heifetz et al. (2013a, p. 59) (properties U0, U1, U2, and DA).
7Composite possibilities allow for more involved subjective views. For example, hi○hj ○hi(n) which
is player i’s perception at decision node n of player j’s perception of what he perceives. However, in
our setting with simple unawareness such involved iterative subjective views will be redundant.
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the other hand, Ann can only choose Cooperate at decision copy n0T and Bob can choose
between cooperate and defect at decision copy n1T following Ann’s action Cooperate.
Consider now a possible extensive-form with simple unawareness as depicted in Fig-
ure 6.8
[Figure 6]
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Ann Ann 
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Bob 
Bob 
1
Tn
0
Tn
1n 2n
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Ann’s possibility function  
Bob’s possibility function 
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Figure 6: An extensive-form with subjective views
The possibility functions shown in Figure 6 indicate that at the initial decision node
n0 of the objective extensive-form N , Ann is an aware player. She perceives the game
to start at decision node hA(n0) = n0 and is aware of all augmented histories in HA.
Conversely, at decision node n0, Bob is an unaware player. He perceives the game to
start at decision copy hB(n0) = n0T and is, thus, only aware of augmented histories in
HTB . At n
0 Ann knows that Bob is unaware, hB ○ hA(n0) = n0T , and at n0T Bob knows
that Ann is of the same awareness as him, hA ○hB(n0T ) = n0T .
If Ann chooses Cooperate, then Bob stays unaware of the fact that Ann could have
chosen Defect. Bob perceives to be at decision copy hB(n1) and is, thus, still only
aware of the augmented histories in HTB . He perceives Ann to also be at decision copy
hA ○hB(n1T ) = n1T and share his subjective view with regard to the feasible paths of play.
If Ann instead chooses Defect, then Bob perceives to be at decision node hB(n2) = n2
and is, thus, now aware of the augmented histories in HB and knows that Ann has
8Because Bob’s augmented histories at decision nodes n0T and n
1
T are redundant, we omitted these
for the sake of simplicity.
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always been aware. Moreover, at this decision node Bob will be surprised. He realizes
that had he observed Ann choosing Cooperate, then he would not have suspected that
she could have chosen anything other than that action.
3 Psychological games with simple unawareness
3.1 Strategies
Let the set of feasible actions for player i at augmented history hi be denoted by Ai,hi .
The structure of our extensive-form with simple unawareness implies that Ai,hi ⊆ Ai,n. A
player’s strategy is a complete description of his disposition to act at different augmented
histories in Hi. A pure strategy for player i thus specifies an action of player i at each
of his augmented histories hi ∈ Hi. A typical strategy is denoted si = (si,hi)hi∈Hi , where
si,hi is the action ai that would be selected by strategy si at augmented history hi. A
strategy si specifies what player i does at each augmented history, both in the case when
hi maps into an element in the objective extensive-form N , and in the case when hi maps
into an element in the subtree T . Let
Si = ∏
hi∈HiAi,hi
be the set of player i’s strategies and S = Si × Sj the set of strategy pairs.
In games with simple unawareness only the objective extensive-form N represents the
physical paths of play in the game. The subtree T represents the restricted subjective
view of the feasible paths in the mind of an unaware player, or the view of the feasible
paths that an aware player assigns to the unaware player. Moreover, as the actual game
in the objective extensive-form N evolves a player may become aware of paths of which
he was unaware earlier. A strategy can therefore in games with simple unawareness not
be conceived as an ex ante plan of action. Like (Heifetz et al., 2013a, p. 58), we interpret
a strategy si of player i as a list of answers to the questions “what would player i do
at each augmented history he considers as possible?” This list of answers should be
interpreted as follows:
(i) For decision node n in the objective extensive-form N the action si,hi(n) should be
interpreted as the action that player i actually takes at n under strategy si, if and
when n is reached.
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(ii) For decision copy nT in subtree T the action si,hi(nT ) should be interpreted as the
action that player i would take at nT if he were unaware. This implies, for example,
if player j perceives to be at hj(n) = nT , then he knows that under strategy si
player i would take the action si,hi○hj(n) if and when nT is reached.
To illustrate strategies in extensive-forms with simple unawareness we again consider
Figure 6. Ann is active only after the initial augmented histories hA(n0) and hA(n0T ), so
we can identify each of her strategies with the actions Cooperate or Defect at hA(n0) and
Corperate at hA(n0T ). Ann’s set of strategies is thus SA = {CC,DC} (the first action
is taken after hA(n0) and the second taken after hA(n0T )). Bob can take one of two
possible actions (cooperate or defect) after each of the two augmented histories hB(n1)
and hB(n2). Thus we identify each of Bob’s four strategies by: SB = {cc, cd, dc, dd}. The
set of strategy pairs in Figure 6 is S = SA × SB = {(CC, cc), (CC, cd), . . . , (DC,dd)}.
The outcome function z ∶ S → Z, associates each strategy profile s ∈ S with the
induced terminal node z(s) = (a1, . . . , al), and is obtained as follows: at the initial
decision node n0 let a1 = (si,hi(n0), sj,hj(n0)), and for each subsequent decision node n
let ak = (si,hi(a1,...,ak−1), sj,hj(a1,...,ak−1)) where 1 < k ≤ l. That is, for each strategy profile
the outcome function maps out the associated path of actions that the player actually
takes throughout the game. For example, if Ann chooses Cooperate at hA(n0), then the
induced terminal node can either be given by the paths (C, c) or (C,d) depending on
Bob’s chosen action sB,hB(n1).
Strategy si reaches augmented history hi if there is a strategy sj of player j such
that the path induced by (si, sj) ∈ S reaches hi. Otherwise, we say that the augmented
history is excluded by the strategy si. The set of strategy pairs that reaches hi is denoted
S(hi). In Figure 6 this implies that, for example, the strategy pairs that reach Bob’s
augmented history hB(n1) are S(hB(n1)) = {(CC, cc), (CC, cd), (CC,dc), (CC,dd)}.
The set of player i’s strategies that reaches hi is denoted Si(hi), which for Bob at
hB(n1) implies the strategy set SB(hB(n1)) = {cc, cd, dc, dd}.
For a strategy si in the objective extensive-form, we denote by sTi the induced strategy
in the subtree T . Strategy si is said to induce strategy sTi if si,hi = sTi,hi for all hi ∈ HTi .
If Ri ⊆ Si is some set of strategies of player i, denote by RTi the set of strategies induced
by Ri in the subtree T .
Observe that Bob at augmented history hB(n2) in Figure 6, after he has become
aware, is not deluded to think that the strategic interaction at hB(n1) is described by
paths of play in subtree T , nor does he think that Ann was ever unaware. Rather,
Bob interprets the action C designated by Ann’s strategy sA = {CC} at hA ○hB(n0) as
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describing his limited subjective view on Ann’s action that would have led to hB(n1T )
had she kept him unaware.
For any solution concept we need to analyze what Ann thinks of Bob’s action at
hB(n1T ), and such actions are determined by a strategy sTB of Bob in subtree T . This is
why a strategy si is defined at all the augmented histories of player i, including those in
which he will never actually take an action. The induced strategy sTi becomes the object
of contemplation and analysis of player j when he is unaware of parts of the actual game.
3.2 Conditional hierarchies of beliefs
Beliefs are modeled as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), but adapted to extensive-
forms with simple unawareness. At an augmented history hi ∈ Hi/HTi , player i holds
updated first-order beliefs about player j’s disposition to act at augmented histories
hi ∈ Hi. Thus, conditional on each hi ∈ Hi/HTi , player i holds an updated, or revised,
belief αi(⋅∣hi) ∈ ∆(Sj(hi)) about the strategies sj of player j that reach hi.
Whereas, at augmented histories hi ∈ HTi , player i’s update first-order belief must
be confined to player j’s disposition to act at augmented histories in HTi . Therefore,
at augmented histories hi ∈ HTi player i holds an updated first-order belief αTi (⋅∣hi) ∈
∆(STj (hi)) about the induced strategies sTj of player j that reach hi.
The two systems of first-order beliefs of unaware and aware player i are
αTi = (αTi (⋅∣hi))hi∈HTi ∈ ∏
hi∈HTi ∆(STj (hi))
and
αi = (αi(⋅∣hi))hi∈Hi/HTi ∈ ∏
hi∈Hi/HTi ∆(Sj(hi)),
respectively. Let αi = (αTi , αi) denote player i’s overt system of first-order beliefs.
Observe, for example, that Bob at hB(n0) = n0T in Figure 6 holds a conditional first-
order belief αTB(⋅∣hB(n0)) ∈ ∆(STA(hB(n0))) about Ann’s induced strategies in subtree
T (which is all of Ann’s induced strategies). If Bob then subsequently finds himself at
hB(n2) = n2, then his belief system will change such that he now has a conditional first-
order belief αB(⋅∣hB(n2)) ∈ ∆(SA(hB(n2))) on Ann’s strategies SA that reach Bob’s
augmented history hB(n2). For example, at hB(n0), Bob’s conditional first-order belief
is on Ann’s induced set of strategies STA(hB(n0)) = {C} that reaches hB(n0). If Bob
finds himself at hB(n2), he becomes aware and his first-order belief will be on Ann’s set
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of strategies SA(hB(n2)) = {CD} that reaches hB(n2). That is, at hB(n2), Bob knows
that Ann could have kept him unaware by using induced strategy sTA = {C}, but instead
chose to make him aware by choosing sA = {CD}.
Player i also holds an updated second-order belief about the first-order belief system
of player j, a third-order belief about the second-order beliefs, and so on. For the
purpose of this paper, we assume that higher-order beliefs are degenerate point beliefs.
Thus, with slight abuse of notation we identify, conditional on each hi ∈Hi, βi(hi) with
a particular system of first-order beliefs (αλj (⋅∣hji))hji∈Hj , where λ = ∅ if hji ∈Hj/HTj and
λ = T if hji ∈HTj . The overt system of second-order beliefs of player i is
βi = (βi(hi))hi∈Hi .
A similar notational convention applies to higher-order beliefs.
At Ann’s augmented history hA(n0) = n0 in Figure 6, she is aware and has first-order
beliefs about Bob’s strategies in SB(hA(n0)) = {cc, cd, dc, dd} that reach hA(n0), and
she knows that Bob is unaware at hB ○hA(n0) ∈ HTB . Her belief about Bob’s first-order
belief about her strategies that reach hB ○ hA(n0) must reflect this unawareness. Ann
thus needs to take Bob’s point of view when considering his first-order beliefs about her
strategies. To do so, she conditions Bob’s first-order beliefs on the composite possibility
function hB ○ hA(n0) = n0T , thereby restricting her second-order beliefs at hA(n0) to
Bob’s first-order beliefs about her strategies in STA = {C}, and so forth for higher-order
beliefs.
Let µi denote the overt (infinite) belief system of player i and Mi the (compact) set
of all such beliefs. It is important to remember that at augmented histories HTi , the
conditional belief system is restricted to first-order beliefs about the induced strategies
STj and second-order beliefs about these. Hence, a player at augmented history hi ∈HTi
does not have first- and second-order beliefs about actions selected by strategies at
augmented histories Hi/HTi . If, however, player i is at an augmented history hi ∈Hi/HTi ,
then the conditional belief system is such that the player has first-order beliefs about
the strategies Sj and second-order beliefs about (i) strategies Si if hji ∈Hj/HTj and (ii)
induced strategies STi if hji ∈ HTj . Players initial beliefs are those held at hi(n0) and
hi(n0T ).
A player should not change his beliefs unless the play reaches an augmented history
which falsifies it. We therefore assume that for awareness level λ ∈ {∅, T} the overt
beliefs µi of player i are consistent such that: (i) there is at least one strategy of player
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j in the support of αλi (⋅∣hi) at some hi, and (ii) that beliefs must satisfy Bayes’ rule and
common certainty of Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Consistency of the updating system
requires that αλi (⋅∣hi), βλi (hi), and so on, at hi are consistent with hi being reached and
that no beliefs are abandoned unless falsified. Thus if Bob, in Figure 6, finds himself at
hB(n2) and becomes aware, then he must change his beliefs such that they are consistent
at his new awareness level.
3.3 Psychological games with simple unawareness
We are now in a position to formally state the definition of psychological games with
simple unawareness:
Definition 3. A psychological game with simple unawareness based on the extensive-
form with subjective views ⟨{i, j},N ,hi,hj⟩ is a structure Γ = ⟨{i, j},N ,hi,hj, ui, uj⟩
where ui ∶ Z ×Mi → R is player i’s (measurable and bounded) psychological payoff
function.
A psychological game with simple unawareness is obtained from a material payoff
game with simple unawareness ⟨{i, j},N ,hi,hj, pii, pij⟩, where pii ∶ Z → R, according to
some formula. Following our definition of extensive-form rationalizability in the subse-
quent section, we will give two examples of specific psychological payoff functions in our
model.
4 Extensive-form rationalizability
As a solution concept we use extensive-form rationalizability [Pearce (1984), Battigalli
(1997), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)] which embodies forward inductive reasoning. In
what follows we extend this definition to psychological games with simple unawareness.
4.1 Sequential Rationality
Our basic behavioral assumption is that player i chooses and carries out a strategy si
that reaches augmented history hi and is optimal given his overt belief µi, conditional
upon any history consistent with si. It is thus not required that a strategy specifies
behavior at augmented histories that cannot be reached by si.
17
Fix an overt belief µi, an augmented history hi, and a strategy si. The expectation
of the psychological payoff ui, given si and µi is
Esi,µi[ui∣hi] ∶= ∑
sj∈Sj α
λ
i (sλj ∣hi) × ui(z(si, sj),µi), (1)
where λ = {∅} if hi ∈ Hi/HTi and λ = T if hi ∈ HTi . At an augmented history in the
subtree, a player’s expected psychological payoff is thus restricted to the part of the
strategy that describes the actions of an unaware player.
Definition 4. Fix an overt belief µi ∈Mi. Strategy si is a sequential best response to
µi if for all hi ∈Hi
si ∈ arg max
si∈Si(hi)Esi,µi[ui∣hi].
Similar for player j.
For any overt belief µi, let BR(µi) denote the set of strategies si that are sequential best
responses to µi in accordance with Definition 4. The set of best responses thus consists
of strategies si of player i that, for a given µi, are undominated at every augmented
history hi ∈Hi given his awareness level λ at hi.
For example, for Bob’s strategy sB = {cd} to be a sequential best response in Figure
6, it must be that it is undominated by his strategies sˆB ∈ {cc, dc, dd} at every hB ∈HB,
given his awareness at hB. The augmented history at which Bob is passive is omitted
in the following. At hB(n1) = n1T , Bob is unaware and knows that Ann’s strategy is
sTA = {C}. Strategy sB = {cd} undominated if its induced strategy sTB = {c} gives him an
equal or higher expected psychological payoff at hB(n1) than induced strategy sˆTB = {d},
giventhat Ann chooses sA = {CC}. At hB(n2) = n2 Bob has observed that Ann has
chosen to make him aware by choosing sA = {CD}. He therefore, at hB(n2), believes
with certainty that Ann’s strategy is sA = {CD}. Bob considers strategy sB = {cd}
undominated if it gives him an equal or higher expected psychological payoff at hB(n2)
than any of the strategies sB ∈ {cc, dc, dd}, given he observes that Ann has chosen
sA = {CD}. Thus, Bob’s strategy sB = {cd} is a sequential best response if, and only if,
it is undominated at both hB(n1) and hB(n2).
Clearly, BRi is nonempty valued. The conditional first-order belief αλi (⋅∣hi) is contin-
uous. Since ui is also continuous, we have that αλi (⋅∣hi)ui(⋅) is continuous, which implies
that BRi is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
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4.2 Best-Rationalization Principle
The best-rationalization principle [Battigalli (1997), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)]
requires that players’ beliefs conditional upon observing augmented history hi be con-
sistent with the highest degree of strategic sophistication of other players. Our analysis
clarifies what is meant by strategic sophistication in terms of psychological games with
unawareness.
Definition 5. Consider the following extensive-form rationalization procedure for player
i:
Mi[1] =Mi,
Ri[1] = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
si ∈ Si such that there exists an overt belief µi ∈Mi[1]
for which si ∈ BR(µi).⋮
Mi[k] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µi ∈Mi[k − 1] such that for all augmented histories hi ∈Hi, if
Rj[k − 1](hi) ≠ ∅, then αλi (Rλj [k − 1]∣hi) = 1, where
λ = {∅} if hi ∈Hi/HTi and λ = T if hi ∈HTi .
Ri[k] = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
si ∈ Si such that there exists an overt belief µi ∈Mi[k]
for which si ∈ BR(µi).
Let Ri[∞] = ⋂k≥0 Ri[k]. Player i’s strategies in Ri[∞] are said to be extensive-form
(correlated) rationalizable in a psychological game with simple unawareness. Similar for
player j.
We start our definition of extensive-form rationalizability at the level of strategic
thinking of player i, whose first level rationalizable strategies are sequential best re-
sponses to some nonrestricted overt belief. Strategies that are not sequential best re-
sponses to any nonrestricted overt belief are not first level rationalizable. Next, player i
restricts his overt beliefs to those for which he, at each augmented history hi, is certain
(given the awareness level at hi) of those first level rationalizable strategies of player j
that reach hi. Player i then chooses second level rationalizable strategies that are sequen-
tial best responses to these restricted overt beliefs. Strategies that are not sequential
best responses to these restricted overt beliefs, on player j’s first level rationalizable
strategies, are not second level rationalizable. Furthermore, player i must restrict his
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restricted overt beliefs to those for which he, at each augmented history hi, is certain
(given the awareness level at hi) of those second level rationalizable strategies of player
j that reach hi. Player i then chooses third level rationalizable strategies that are se-
quential best responses to these restricted-restricted overt beliefs. Strategies that are
not sequential best responses to these restricted-restricted overt beliefs, on player j’s
second level rationalizable strategies, are not third level rationalizable, and so on.
Remark 1. {Ri[k] ∶ k ≥ 0} is a weakly decreasing sequence, that is, Ri[k+1] ⊆ Ri[k] for
all k. Since Ri is a closed set (because the correspondences BRi is upper hemicontinuous),
the sequence converges in countably many steps. The limit is given by the first integer
K such that Ri[K] = Ri[K + 1]. Similar for player j.
Definition 5 and Remark 1 can be interpreted as follows. Consider the limit set
Ri[K] of player i. The sequence Rj[0],Rj[1], . . . ,Rj[K − 1] represents a hierarchy of
increasingly strong hypotheses of player i about the behavior of player j. When player
i implements a strategy si ∈ Ri[K], he always optimize accordingly. At the beginning of
the game, it is the common belief that all players update and behave in this way.
The set Mk (for k > 1) implies that along each feasible path of play, at an augmented
history an active player is certain that the other player sequential best responds, certain
that the other player is certain he sequential best responds, and so on. If a player
finds himself at some succeeding augmented history, where the other player’s strategies
that could lead to that augmented history are inconsistent with the player’s previous
certainty in the other player’s best response, then the player seeks a best rationalization
which could have led to that augmented history. That is, if the player is “surprised”
by the other player’s unexpected action, and cannot use Bayesian updating, then he
forms new beliefs that justify this observed inconsistency. In its simplest form, forward-
induction reasoning involves the assumption that, upon observing an unexpected (but
undominated) action of the other player, a player maintains the working hypothesis
that the latter is a sequential best response. The best-rationalization principle captures
precisely this type of argument.
Forward-induction reasoning implies that at hB(n0T ) and onwards, unaware Bob is
certain that Ann’s sequential best response is sTA = {CC}. However, if augmented
history hB(n2) is reached and Bob becomes aware, then he is certain given his newly
found awareness that Ann’s action sA = {CD} is a sequential best response to some
overt belief of hers. At hB(n2), Bob has no choice but to revert to being certain that
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Ann would not choose the strategy sA = {CC} rationally, and excludes Ann’s overt
beliefs for which sA = {CC} is a sequential best response.
Using extensive-form rationalizability as a solution concept highlights the need to
define strategies by the actions taken not only at decision nodes, which represent actual
paths of play, but also at decision copies. However, at each decision node, the augmented
history hi that is considered possible could be in the subtree describing a restrictive view
of the feasible paths of play, and at that point the player can only perceive his strategy
in terms of these paths. Furthermore, players can only rank the other player’s strategies
according to their perhaps restricted awareness. An aware player must, for example,
consider an unaware player’s strategies in terms of how he perceives the game, that is,
in the subtree which represents an unaware players’ subjective view.
5 Guilt Aversion and Reciprocity
The two most prominent theories of belief-dependent preferences in the hitherto existing
literature on dynamic psychological games are guilt aversion and reciprocity. Simple
guilt aversion a` la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), for example, implies that player
i judges the initial expectations of player j concerning his material payoff and feels
guilty whenever he does not live up to these expectations. More formally, consider a
psychological game with simple unawareness as defined above. Given his strategy sj
and the overt first-order belief system αj, player j forms an initial expectation about
his material payoff pij:
Esj ,αj[pij ∣hj(n0)] =∑
si
αλj (sλi ∣hj(n0))pij(z(sj, si)),
with λ = {∅} if hj(n0) ∈ Hj/HTj (i.e. if player j is initially aware) and λ = T if hj(n0) ∈
HTj (i.e. if player j is initially unaware). For every terminal node z the function
Dj(z, sj,αj) =max{0,Esj ,αj[pij ∣hj(n0)] − pij(z)}
measures how much player j is let down relative to his initial expectation. Of course,
player i does not know player j’s strategy and first-order beliefs, but holds a belief about
these. Denote player i’s belief about player j’s let-down by Dij(z, sj,βi), where βi is
player i’s overt second-order belief. Given this, player i is motivated by simply guilt
if he has belief-dependent preferences represented by a utility function of the following
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form:
ui(z(si, sj),µi) = pii(z) − θijDij(z, sj,βi) (2)
where θij is player i’s sensitivity to guilt. A guilt averse player i tries to maximize the
expected value of equation 2 (see equation 1 in section 4.1). He senses a psychological
cost connected to his feeling of guilt in case he does not live up to his belief about player
j’s expectation and takes this into account when deciding on his optimal behavior.
Different to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), players’ feelings of guilt in our setting
with simple unawareness depend on their awareness level and the awareness level of
the other player. If, for example, player j is unaware of certain feasible paths of play,
player i’s belief about how much he let’s down player j takes player j’s unawareness into
account.
Different from guilt aversion, reciprocity assumes that players judge the kindness of
others. Whenever player i judges player j to be kind, he reciprocates by being kind
himself. Whenever player i judges player j to be unkind, he acts unkindly in return (see
e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)). More formally, given an augmented history
hj, a strategy sj that reaches hj and the overt first-order belief system αj, player j forms
an expectation about player i’s material payoff pii:
Esj ,αj[pii∣hj] =∑
si
αλj (sλi ∣hj)pii(z(si, sj))
with λ = {∅} if hj ∈ Hj/HTj and λ = T if hj ∈ HTj . Player j’s kindness towards player
i is described by how much player j expects to give player i relative to some equitable
payoff piei (hj) at augmented history hj:
Kji(hj) = Esj ,αj[pii∣hj] − piei (hj).
The equitable payoff is the threshold or neutral payoff above (below) which player j
treats player i kindly (unkindly). In other words, if Kji(⋅) > 0, then player j treats
player i kindly. Conversely, if Kji(⋅) < 0, then player j treats player i unkindly. Let the
equitable payoff be
piei (hj) = 12 × [maxsj (Esj ,αj[pii∣hj]) +minsj (Esj ,αj[pii∣hj])] .
The equitable payoff is the average player j is able to give to player i in material terms
based on his awareness and first-order belief. Of course, as in the case of guilt aversion,
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player i does not know strategy sj and first-order beliefs αj, but holds a first- and second-
order belief about them. Denote player i’s judgment of player j’s kindness at augmented
history hi by Kiji(hi) = Esj ,βi[pii∣hji] − piei (hji), where βi is player i’s overt second-order
belief. We say player i is motivated by reciprocity if he has belief-dependent preferences
represented by a utility function of the form:
ui(z,µi∣hi) = pii(z) + Yi ×Kiji(hi) × pij(z), (3)
where Yi > 0 is player i’s sensitivity to reciprocity. A reciprocal player i tries to maximize
the expected value of equation 3. Whenever player i perceives player j to be kind, player
i is motivated to also maximize player j’s material payoff. In case player i judges player
j to be unkind, player i is motivated to reduce player j’s material payoff. This definition
of reciprocity implies that if player i is unaware of certain feasible paths of play, he
judges the kindness of player j based on the feasible paths that he is aware of.
With unawareness the judgments of players regarding the intentions and expectations
of others, and hence, the influence of these on the players’ behavior crucially depend
on the awareness of players, the awareness players attribute to others, the awareness
players belief other attribute to them, and so on. In the following section we apply these
belief-dependent preferences in two examples highlighting the role of unawareness in the
interaction of agents motivated by reciprocity and guilt aversion.
6 Two examples
In the following we present two examples to highlight the impact and importance of
simple unawareness in the strategic interaction of players with belief-dependent prefer-
ences. In particular, our examples demonstrate that the strategic behavior of players
motivated by belief-dependent preferences crucially depends on their awareness concern-
ing the strategic environment they are in. As a consequence, players’ awareness levels
are an important and integral part of the strategic environment. First, we analyze a
sequential prisoners dilemma featuring unawareness and reciprocity. Second, we inves-
tigate a trust game with guilt aversion. A full description of the strategic interaction
with all possible awareness levels is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we limit
the analysis to specific awareness scenarios.
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A sequential prisoners dilemma with reciprocity: Consider the following aware-
ness scenario already depicted in Figure 6 with Ann’s and Bob’s material payoffs added:9
[Figure 7]
In the strategic setting depicted in Figure 7, Ann is initially aware of everything, whereas
Bob is initially unaware. Ann knows this, and knows that he only becomes aware of
everything if she chooses Defect. Also, Ann knows that Bob perceive her to be unaware.
We assume that Bob is motivated by belief-dependent reciprocity and Ann is selfish.
Bob’s psychological utility is thus described by equations 3, while Ann’s is equal to her
monetary payoff (uA(z) = piA(z)). Ann’s optimal strategy depends on her first-order
belief about Bob strategy (conditional on her behavior). Her strategy sA = {CC} is a
sequential best response as long as her expected material payoff from strategy sA = {CC}
exceeds her expected material payoff from strategy sA = {CD}. Her expected material
payoff from strategy sA = {CC} is:
E{CC},αA[piA∣hA(n0)] = αA({c⋅})∣hA(n0))(1) + (1 − αA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)))(−1),
where αA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)) ∶= ∑sB∈{cc,cd}αA(sB ∣hA(n0)) is a shorthand notation for Ann’s
first-order belief about the strategies ofBob that select the action cooperate at augmented
history hB(n1) = n1T . Ann’s expected material payoff from following strategy sA = {CD}
is:
E{CD},αA[piA∣hA(n0)] = αA({⋅c}∣hA(n0))(2) + (1 − αA({⋅c}∣hA(n0)))(0),
where αA({⋅c}∣hA(n0)) ∶= ∑sB∈{cc,dc}αA(sB ∣hA(n0)) is an akin shorthand notation. The
first level rationalizable strategies of Ann are thus
RA[1] = {sA ∶ αA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)) − αA({⋅c}∣hA(n0)) ≥ 1
2
⇒ sA = {CC},
otherwise⇒ sA = {CD}}.
Bob, on the other hand, is initially passive and only becomes active at augmented
histories hB(n1) = n1T and hB(n2) = n2. Remember that at augmented history hB(n1),
Bob is unaware and holds a first-order belief αTB(sTA∣hB(n1)) and a second-order point
belief βB(hB(n1)) concerning Ann’s restricted first-order belief αTA(sTB ∣hB(n0T )). Given
his unawareness at hB(n1), Bob thinks that Ann’s only action is Cooperate. Independent
9For the sake of clarity we only depict augmented histories hi for Ann and Bob that are relevant
for solving the game.
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of his second-order belief and his sensitivity to reciprocity YB he thus judges Ann as
neither kind nor unkind (KBAB(hB(n1)) = 0). Consequently, whenever Bob finds himself
at hB(n1) he will simply maximize his own material payoff by choosing defect.
At augmented history hB(n2) = n2, Bob is aware of everything and knows that he
could have earned a monetary payoff of 2 had Ann initially chosen to keep him unaware
by choosing Cooperate. Bob’s judgment of Ann’s intention towards him at hB(n2) is
EsA,βB[piB ∣hB(n2)] = βB({⋅c}∣hB(n2)) ⋅ (−1) + (1 − βB({⋅c}∣hB(n2))) ⋅ (0),
where βB({⋅c}∣hB(n2)) ∶= ∑sB∈{cc,dc} βB(hB(n2)) is a shorthand notation for Bob’s
second-order belief about the likelihood with which Ann believes he chooses cooperate at
augmented history hB(n2). Clearly, 2 > EsA,βB[piB ∣hB(n2)] independent of second-order
belief βB(hB(n2)). Hence, Bob judges Ann as unkind when finding himself at hB(n2).
The first level rationalizable strategies of Bob are thus
RB[1] = {sB ∶ for all βB, YB ⇒ sB = {dd}}.
Although Bob is motivated by belief-dependent reciprocity as defined in equation 3, his
behavior in our sequential prisoners dilemma with unawareness is independent of his
(second-order) beliefs and independent of his sensitivity to reciprocity YB.
Bob’s set of first level rationalizable strategies is a singleton set RB[1] = {dd}. Ann
is thus at all her augmented histories certain that Bob follows strategy sB = {dd}. That
is, Ann’s overt beliefs µA ∈MA[2] are all such that αA({dd}∣⋅) = 1. Being certain that
Bob chooses defect no matter what, Ann’s sequential best response strategy must also
select Defect as an action (since 0 > −1). The second level rationalizable strategies of
Ann are thus
RA[2] = {sA ∶ for all µA ∈MA[2]⇒ sA = {CD}}.
Ann anticipates that given his awareness, Bob judges her as unkind and chooses defect
independent of what she does. Consequently, since Ann is only interested in her own
material payoff, she chooses Defect herself to get a material payoff of 0 instead of −1.
To study the impact of unawareness, we compare this awareness scenario to the ratio-
nalizable solution of the sequential prisoners dilemma with reciprocity and full awareness
(see figure ).
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[Figure 8]
Now Ann chooses to Cooperate in the initial augmented history hA(n0) = n0 as long as
she believes sufficiently strongly that Bob will cooperate given that she chooses strategy
sA = {CC}. Her expected payoff from choosing either sA = {CC} or sA = {CD} at
the augmented history hA(n0) is the same as before, and her first level rationalizable
strategies are again:
RA[1] = {sA ∶ αA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)) − αA({⋅c}∣hA(n0)) ≥ 1
2
⇒ sA = {CC},
otherwise ⇒ sA = {CD}}.
Bob’s optimal behavior at hB(n2) = n2 remains the same as before. That is, Bob chooses
defect out of monetary and reciprocal reasons. However, Bob’s optimal behavior at
hB(n1) = n1 now depends on his sensitivity to reciprocity YB. Let Bob’s (second-order)
belief about Ann’s belief concerning the likelihood with which he chooses cooperate
at hB(n1), be βB({c⋅}∣hB(n1)) ∶= ∑sB∈{cc,cd} βB(hB(n1)). The first level rationalizable
strategies of Bob are thus:
RB[1] = {sB ∶ βB({c⋅}∣hB(n1)) ≤ 2 − 1
YB
⇒ sB = {cd}, (4)
otherwise ⇒ sB = {dd}}.
The lower Bob’s second-order belief is, the kinder he perceives Ann’s strategy sA = {CC}
(KBAB = 1− 12 ⋅βB({c⋅}∣hB(n1))), which provides him with a payoff which is higher than
if she had chosen strategy sA = {CD}. At hB(n1), Bob never actually thinks Ann is
unkind. The question at this augmented history simply is whether he thinks she is kind
enough, given his sensitivity to reciprocity YB, such that he prefers to reciprocate her
kindness.
If Bob’s sensitivity to reciprocity is low (YB ≤ 12), such that he for sure chooses defect
if Ann chooses Cooperate, then Ann chooses strategy sA = {CD} as this provides her
with a higher expected material payoff. Conversely, if Bob’s sensitivity to reciprocity
is high (YB ≥ 1), Ann is certain that Bob chooses cooperate if she chooses Cooperate.
Given this, she chooses sA = {CC} as this provides her with a higher expected material
payoff. Notice, if Bob is sensitive enough to Ann’s kindness, then he chooses cooperate at
hB(n1) independent of his second-order belief. Given this Ann also chooses Cooperate,
something she would not do were she sure that Bob would be unaware. Based on RB[1],
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Figure 7: Sequential Prisoners Dilemma with unawareness
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Figure 8: Sequential Prisoners Dilemma with full awareness
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Ann’s overt beliefs are
MA[2] = {µA ∶ for all YB ≥ 1⇒ αA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)) = 1,
for all YB < 1
2
⇒ αA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)) = 0}.
At the second level of reasoning, Ann is certain that a very sensitive Bob will always
cooperate if she also cooperates, whereas a very insensitive Bob will always defect no
matter what. For intermediate sensitivity levels, 12 ≤ YB < 1, her overt beliefs are
MA[2] =MA[1]. Ann’s second level rationalizable strategies are thus:
RA[2] = {sA ∶ for YB ≥ 1⇒ sA = {CC},
for
1
2
≤ YB < 1, γA({c⋅}∣hA(n0)) ≤ 2 − 1
YB
⇒ sA = {CC},
otherwise ⇒ sA = {CD}}.
where γA denotes Ann’s (third-order) point belief about Bob’s second-order belief. Based
on RA[2], Bob’s second level overt beliefs are
MB[3] = {µB ∶ for YB ≥ 1⇒ βB({c⋅}∣hb(n1)) = 1,
for YB < 1
2
⇒ βB({c⋅}∣hB(n1)) = 0,
otherwise ⇒ δB({c⋅}∣hB(n1)) ≤ 2 − 1
YB
, βB({c⋅}∣hB(n1)) = 1}.
where δB denotes Bob’s (fourth-order) belief about Ann’s third-order beliefs. MB[3]
implies that Bob believes that Ann expects him to choose sB = {cd} whenever he finds
himself at augmented history hB(n1). Bob’s third-level rationalizable strategies are thus:
RB[3] = {sB ∶ for YB ≥ 1⇒ sB = {cd},
otherwise YB < 1⇒ sB = {dd}}.
If Bob is sensitive enough to reciprocity (YB ≥ 1), he always chooses cooperate if Ann
chooses Cooperate, and chooses defect ifAnn chooses Defect. If he is insensitive enough to
reciprocity (YB < 12), then he always chooses defect no matter what Ann does. However,
if his sensitivity to reciprocity is 12 ≤ YB < 1 and he finds himself at hB(n1), then he is
certain that Ann believes that he will cooperate (βB({c⋅}∣hB(n1)) = 1). That is, 1 > 2− 1YB
and he defects although he believes that Ann believes that he will cooperate. Finally,
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Ann’s fourth-level rationalizable strategies are:
RA[4] = {sA ∶ for all YB ≥ 1⇒ sA = {CC},
for all YB < 1⇒ sB = {CD}}
With full awareness, if Bob is sufficiently sensitive to reciprocity (YB ≥ 1), then Ann
chooses to Cooperate since this induces Bob to choose cooperate as well. This stands
in contrast to the result of the first awareness scenario in which Bob was unaware of
Ann’s possibility to defect even after her choice Cooperate. This example highlights that,
although belief-dependent reciprocity is only based on first- and second-order beliefs, the
recursive nature of extensive-form rationalizability requires the specification of higher
(potentially infinite) orders of beliefs.
In synthesis: although Bob’s sensitivity to reciprocity might be very high, his behav-
ior in the first awareness scenario stands in contrast to the result with full awareness.
With full awareness Bob’s behavior following Ann’s action Cooperate depends on Bob’s
sensitivity to reciprocity. For sufficiently high levels of sensitivity Bob reciprocates by
choosing cooperate. With unawareness as in the previous scenario Bob’s behavior is inde-
pendent of his sensitivity to reciprocity. Bob simply defects as he perceives Ann’s action
as unkind no matter what she does. As a consequence, also Ann’s behavior is qualified.
She defects as well. Interestingly, not controlling for his awareness, Bob behaves as if he
is selfish, although he is not. It is only his subjective perception concerning the strategic
environment which drives his optimal behavior in our sequential prisoners dilemma with
simple unawareness.
It is at the intersection of these two scenarios that the implications of unawareness for
the behavior of people motivated by belief-dependent preferences become most visible. It
is easy to see that, if Bob were only interested in his own material payoff, his behavior in
the two awareness scenarios would be the same. Most importantly, being only interested
in his own material payoff means Bob would choose defect following Ann’s decision to
Cooperate independent of whether he is only aware of augmented histories in subtree T
(as in the first scenario) or everything (as in the second scenario). It is only his belief-
dependent utility which explains the above-described difference in behavior between the
first and second awareness scenario.
A trust game: Consider the trust game also analyzed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009). However, different to them assume that Bob is aware of everything, but Ann is
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not aware of Bob’s action Share (see figure ):10
[Figure 9]
Assume Bob is motivated by simple guilt aversion as described by equation 2, and that
Ann is only interested in her own material payoff. If there is full awareness, Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2009, p. 21) demonstrate that the rationalizable solution is such that
Ann chooses Trust and Bob chooses Share.
Less formally than before: With unawareness as depicted in Figure 9, Bob knows
that Ann is not ‘let down’, if he chooses Grab following her decision to Trust. That
is, he simply knows that Ann does not expect him to choose Share following Trust
because she is unaware of the possibility that he could Share. Hence, Bob does not feel
any guilt towards Ann from choosing Grab following Trust (DBA = 0). Of course, Ann
(correctly) anticipates that Bob chooses Grab following Trust and thus chooses Don′t
in the augmented history hA(n0) = n0T she initially perceives to be in.
Like the previous example featuring reciprocity, also this example with guilt aversion
demonstrates the impact of unawareness on the behavior of players with belief-dependent
preferences. In particular, it highlights that ‘managing others awareness levels’ concern-
ing feasible paths of play is an important and integral part of strategic interactions when
players are motivated by belief-dependent preferences. The fact that Ann is unaware of
Bob’s action Share implies that he would not feel any guilt towards Ann for choosing
Grab, since she would not be let down. However, if he could, Bob would like to make
Ann aware of his option Share before she chooses between Don′t and Trust, an option
not considered in our example in Figure 9. He would like to make her aware in order
to signal to her that they could Share. Of course, if he were to do this the analysis
would mirror Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, p. 21)’s analysis. Interestingly, were
Bob only interested in his own monetary payoff, he would not be concerned about Ann
being or not being aware of his option Share, as Ann would in any case choose Don′t
anticipating his selfish behavior.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the influence and importance of unawareness concerning feasible paths
of play for the strategic interaction of players in psychological games, and defined a two-
10Again, for the sake of clarity we only depict the function hi for Ann and Bob in the non-terminal
histories relevant for solving the game.
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player model in which players are motivated by belief-dependent preferences and simple
unawareness of certain feasible paths of play. Using this model we provide different
examples highlighting the role of unawareness in the strategic interaction of players
motivated by reciprocity a` la Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and guilt aversion a`
la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007).
Our examples demonstrate that the strategic behavior of players motivated by belief-
dependent preferences crucially depends on their awareness concerning the strategic
environment they are in, their perception concerning the awareness of others, their
perception concerning the perception of others etc.
In other words, unawareness has a profound and intuitive impact on the strategic
interaction of players with belief-dependent psychological preferences - a fact that creates
both an opportunity as well as a challenge to empirically investigations analyzing the
strength and nature of belief-dependent preferences.
Concentrating on two-player environments and simple awareness scenarios obviously
puts limits to the strategic situations that can be analyzed with our model. Nevertheless
our simple model has allowed us to uncover intriguing effects. More general strategic
environments with more complex awareness scenarios are left for future research.
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Figure 9: Trust game with unawareness
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